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Abstract
Sectoral data features (i) changing relative expenditures of different sec-
tors, (ii) non-constancy in relative prices and (iii) long-run trends in relative
TFP growth rates across sectors. We provide a tractable theory of industry
directed technical change, which is able to reconcile these findings. In doing
so, this paper emphasizes the importance of directed technical change, non-
homotheticity of preferences and structural change as a long-run phenomenon.
Using the input-output tables of the U.S., our theory helps us to reconstruct
how structural change in terms of final consumption affects the market size of
industry value-added. Arguing that the structural change across broad cate-
gories of final consumption is exogenous from the perspective of an individual
firm, this gives us an instrument for the industrial market size (at the value-
added level). We then empirically test for the market size effect of induced
innovation. Our findings suggest that a 1 percent increase in an industry’s
market size (relative to GDP) leads to an increase in the TFP growth rate of
about 0.3 percentage points over five years.
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21 Introduction
Structural change – defined as changes in relative expenditures of different sectors
– is according to Kuznets (1973) one of the six main features of modern economic
growth and development. In addition, differences in productivity growth rates across
sectors generate systematic relative price dynamics. The literature provides two the-
oretically robust mechanism which link the sector specific expenditure structure to
relative prices: On the one hand, if sectors differ in their total factor productivity
(TFP) growth rates, relative prices change over time and structural change can be
the result. This mechanism was emphasized by Baumol (1967), who illustrates that
the nominal expenditure structure is affected by relative price changes whenever the
elasticity of substitution is unequal to unity. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) implement
this channel in a neoclassical growth model with intertemporal optimization and
balanced growth on the aggregate.
On the other hand, the literature on directed technical change emphasizes that
changes in the relative market size of different sectors translate into changes in sec-
tor specific R&D investments, which in turn determine the relative TFP growth rate
and finally the dynamics of the relative price. This second mechanism goes back
to Schmookler (1962) and Griliches and Schmookler (1963) and was first formalized
in a dynamic general equilibrium setting in Acemoglu (1998), Acemoglu and Zili-
botti (2001) and Acemoglu (2002). If expenditure shares change over time, a theory
of induced innovation suggests that an increasing fraction of total R&D activity
concentrates on sectors with an increasing expenditure share. This intensified R&D
activity translates into an increase in the relative TFP growth rate and consequently
into a decrease in the relative price growth of sectors with a rising output share.
Interestingly, in these two theoretical approaches above, the causality of the link
between expenditure shares and relative price dynamics runs in different directions.
This makes empirical identification difficult and has contributed to the fact that em-
3pirical quantification of the two channels remains relatively rare.1 As an additional
(theoretical) challenge, relative price changes are not the only driver of structural
change. Whenever preferences are non-homothetic, income effects also determine the
demand structure, along any growth path with increasing living standards. How-
ever, although there is ample evidence that this channel is quantitatively important,
we are not aware of any theory of directed technical change which does allow for
non-homothetic preferences.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a model of directed technical
change in which structural change happens due to both relative price and income
effects. In contrast to the standard theory of directed technical change, structural
change will not only be a transitional dynamic but a long-run process, being present
even asymptotically. Within the model, there are two final consumption goods
which enter the instantaneous utility function of households. Both final goods are
produced using an identical set of intermediate industries, varying only in the in-
tensities with which these are used. Due to these intensity differences, structural
change in terms of final output goods trickles down to a structural change in terms
of industry value-added. Since the endogenous innovation process takes place at
the industry level, changes in industrial market sizes induce a shift in industry spe-
cific R&D investments, which finally determines the evolution of final output prices.
Although the model replicates this rich, disaggregate production structure, it still
features balanced growth on the aggregate in line with Kaldor’s (1961) stylized facts
and can be solved by paper and pencil.
In the empirical section, we use U.S. industry level data to test the “market size hy-
pothesis” explicitly. In line with our theory, our strategy is to construct an industry
specific exogenous variation in market size that allows to separate the market size
1Acemoglu and Linn (2004) is a notable exception showing evidence for a causal link between
market size and innovation within the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.
4effect from the (potentially counter-acting) substitution effect. More specifically, we
instrument the industrial market size by structural change at the final output level.
We use the input-output relationship of the U.S. economy (similar to Herrendorf,
Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2009) in order to determine how shifts on the final output
level affect the industrial value-added structure. The identifying assumption of this
IV approach is that an individual firm – which makes its R&D investment decision –
takes variations in the potential industrial market size, caused by aggregate demand
shifts, as exogenously given.2 Our results suggest that there is indeed a positive
market size effect and TFP growth tends to increase in industries which inherently
gain from the structural change on the level of final consumption goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a motivating
example of structural change and directed technical change, before Section 3 pro-
ceeds with the theoretical model. Our empirical test for the market size effect is
provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating Example
We motivate this paper’s main mechanism with U.S. data of the durable and non-
durable good sector. Figure 1 plots the total nominal expenditures on non-durable
goods relative to total expenditures on durables on a logarithmic scale. Apart from
the volatility due to recessions and World War II, the series has a strong negative
trend (see dashed line). The annual growth rate of non-durable goods expenditures
is on average 1.32 percentage points lower than the one of durable goods.
The corresponding price of non-durable relative to durable consumption goods is
plotted in Figure 2. On a logarithmic scale, this series is clearly nonlinear, high-
2Note that in contrast to Acemoglu and Linn (2004), our strategy enables us to evaluate the
market size hypothesis across the complete set of U.S. industries.
5lighting that the growth rate of the relative price is systematically changing over
time.3 The growth rate of the relative price of non-durables (i.e., the slope of the
series in Figure 2) increases continuously, being slightly negative in the thirties and
clearly positive around 2012. A quadratic fit to the relative price series (see dashed
line) suggests that the annualized growth rate of the relative price increases each
year by about 0.048 percentage points. While it was minus 0.74 percent in 1930,
it is plus 3.18 percent in 2012. As long-run dynamics in relative sectoral prices are
typically explained by differences in sector specific total factor productivity (TFP)
growth rates, the convex relative price path (on a logarithmic scale) depicted in
Figure 2 indicates a huge shift in the direction of technical progress. This view
is confirmed by Figure 3 which displays the decreasing time trend of the relative
TFP growth rate of the non-durable compared to the durable sector. Consequently,
explaining the relative price path depicted in Figure 2 requires a theory of sector
specific endogenous growth.
Combining Figures 1 and 2 demonstrates that a theory of structural change that
relies solely on substitution effects is insufficient to explain the data. First, the fact
that nominal expenditures of the durable sector – whose relative price decreases
– expand faster requires the elasticity of substitution to be larger than unity. In
the structural change literature this case is regarded as empirically less relevant.
Second, although the relative price barely changed over the first thirty years of the
observed period, structural change is present even then. These two facts require a
theory which allows for non-homothetic preferences and thus includes income effects
3The patterns outlined in Figure 1 and 2 are not an artifact of focusing on nominal personal
consumption expenditures. The facts are unchanged when plotting total output of the durable
and non-durable sector (see Figure C.1 in Online Appendix C). In addition, Figure C.2 in Online
Appendix C shows that the non-durable good sector is also expanding in real terms at a slower
rate than the durable good sector.
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Figure 1: Nominal personal consumption expenditures on non-durables
relative to expenditures on durables
Notes: The figure plots the nominal personal consumption expenditures devoted to non-durable goods relative to the one devoted to
durable goods in the U.S. for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. If we regress the logarithm of the relative expenditures on a constant
and the year, the slope coefficient is -0.01316 with a standard error of 0.00078.
Source: BEA, NIPA table 2.4.5.
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Figure 2: Relative consumer price index of non-durables relative to
durables
Notes: The figure plots the relative price between non-durables and durables in the U.S. for 1929-2012 on a logarithmic scale. If
we regress the logarithm of the relative price on a constant and the year in level and squared, the slope coefficients are -0.92990 and
0.00024 respectively (with standard errors of 0.04609 and 0.00001). The relative price is normalized to one in the year 2005.
Source: BEA, NIPA table 2.4.4.
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Figure 3: Difference between TFP growth rates of non-durables and
durables
Notes: The figure plots the difference between the rate of TFP growth of non-durables and the TFP growth rate of durables for
the years 1978-2007 using input coefficients from I-O tables as weights. The slope of the fitted line is given by -0.00069 with a
standard error of 0.00027. The information of input-output tables is used to calculate the value-added industry weights of final non-
durable/durable consumption. Then, the calculated TFP growth rate in terms of final consumption is the weighted average of the
industries’ value-added TFP growth (where the weights are these input-output coefficients). For more details see Online Appendix
B.
Source: EU KLEMS; BEA, NIPA table 2.4.5, own calculation.
9as an additional driver of structural change.4 Moreover, the sweeping change in the
expenditure structure (see Figure 1), which persists for more than eight decades,
calls for a theory in which structural change is a long-run phenomenon.
Motivated by this illustrative example, we proceed to present our theoretical model.
3 Theoretical model
3.1 Terminology of “sectors” and “industries”
We develop a theory of directed technical change, where structural change is driven
by both an income and a relative price effect. Preferences are specified over two
final consumption goods. A luxury good with an expenditure elasticity of demand
larger than unity, called the “durable” and a necessary good with an expenditure
elasticity of demand strictly smaller than unity, called “non-durable”. The durable
and non-durable goods are the two sectors. Both final goods are produced using
the same set of intermediate inputs, which consists of different industries i ∈ [0, 1].
And the production processes of the two final consumption goods differ in their
intensities with which they rely on a specific industry i.
4Especially, in the context of durable and non-durable goods the importance of income effects
are incontestable as food expenditures account for 48.1 percent of non-durable expenditures in the
year 1929 and Engel’s law is regarded as one of the most robust empirical findings in economics
(see Engel 1857, Houthakker, 1957 and Browning, 2008). This view is confirmed by Figure C.4 in
Online Appendix C, which plots the fraction of goods expenditures devoted to durables for each
income quartile of the U.S. on a logarithmic scale. Richer household devote a systematically larger
fraction of their goods expenditures to durable goods.
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3.2 Production
3.2.1 Production of the final good in the two sectors
Both durable and non-durable goods are produced competitively with Cobb-Douglas
technologies defined over the same unit interval of intermediate inputs, {xi(t)}
1
i=0,
YD(t) = exp
[∫ 1
0
log [xi(t)] di
]
and
YN(t) = exp [∆t] exp
[∫ 1
0
α(i) log [xi(t)] di
]
B.
The term ∆ R 0 captures (potential) exogenous differences in the relative sector-
specific productivity growth rate and B is a normalizing constant
B = exp
[
−
∫ 1
0
α(i) log [α(i)] di
]
.
Production of both final goods relies on the same set of intermediate inputs. How-
ever, the two sectors use them with different intensities. While the output elasticity
of intermediate input xi(t) is unity in the durable good sector, it is α(i) ≥ 0 in the
non-durable sector. We have
∫ 1
0
α(i)di = 1 and we denote the variance of the α(i)’s
by σ2 ≥ 0, i.e. σ2 ≡
∫ 1
0
α(i)2di−1. If σ2 = 0, the weights of the intermediate inputs
are exactly the same for both final good sectors. In contrast, the larger σ2, the more
intensities differ across the two sectors.
Since final output markets are competitive the prices will be equal to the marginal
cost. We set the durable good as the nume´raire, i.e., we have
1 = exp
[∫ 1
0
log [pi(t)] di
]
, (1)
and the (relative) price of the non-durable good is given by
PN(t) = exp
[
−∆t+
∫ 1
0
(α(i)− 1) log [pi(t)] di
]
, (2)
11
where pi(t) is the price of intermediate industry input i.
5 The relative price between
non-durable and durable goods, PN(t), changes for two reason. First, if ∆ 6= 0,
there is an exogenous difference in the productivity growth rates which leads to a
trend in relative prices. Second, as long as the two sectors use industries i ∈ [0, 1]
with different intensities, i.e., σ2 6= 0, dynamics in intermediate industry prices pi(t)
also affect PN(t).
In the following we explain industry specific price changes by endogenous technical
progress at the intermediate industry level.
3.2.2 Production of intermediate inputs
The intermediate inputs are produced competitively according to a standard “lab-
equipment model” (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2009),
yi(t) =
ν
ν − 1
[∫ Mi(t)
0
χ(ωi, t)
ν−1
ν dωi
]
Li(t)
1
ν , (3)
where ν > 1. Li(t) denotes labor used in intermediate input production of industry
i. Labor is fully mobile across sectors and earns a wage rate w(t). χ(ωi, t) is the
amount of “machines” of variety ωi that is used in the production of intermediate i.
At a given date t, Mi(t) denotes the number of different available machine varieties.
The marginal costs of a machine χ(ωi, t) are ψi(t) =
ν−1
ν
pi(t), i.e.
ν−1
ν
units of
intermediate input yi(t). Each machine producer acts as a monopolist. Under these
assumptions, firms’ optimization implies the results that are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Each machine producer sets its price at each point in time equal to
p(ωi, t) =
ν
ν − 1
ψi(t) = pi(t), ∀ωi. (4)
5The righthand sides of (1) and (2) represent the unit cost of the corresponding production
functions in terms of the nume´raire.
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Cost minimization and perfect competition at the intermediate industry level implies
χ(ωi, t) = Li(t), ∀ωi, (5)
and
pi(t) = (ν − 1)
w(t)
Mi(t)
, ∀i, (6)
where w is the wage rate. Then, at a given point in time, each monopolist ωi earns
a profit flow of
π(ωi, t) =
ν − 1
ν
w(t)Li(t)
Mi(t)
, ∀ωi. (7)
The total amount of produced intermediate inputs i can be expressed as
yi(t) =
ν
ν − 1
Mi(t)Li(t). (8)
The total amount of intermediate inputs i used to produce machines ωi is
ci(t) =
ν − 1
ν
Mi(t)Li(t). (9)
Proof. Since the market of intermediates is competitive, the representative firm
solves
min
χ(ωi,t),Li(t)
∫ Mi(t)
0
p(ωi, t)χ(ωi, t)dωi + Li(t)w(t), (10)
subject to (3) and a given output level yi(t). Calling the multiplier of constraint (3)
pi(t) the first order conditions are,
p(ωi, t) = χ(ωi, t)
−
1
νLi(t)
1
ν pi(t), ∀ωi, (11)
w(t) =
1
ν − 1
[∫ Mi(t)
0
χ(ωi, t)
ν−1
ν dωi
]
Li(t)
−ν+1
ν pi(t). (12)
Due to the iso-elastic demand (11) it is optimal for the monopolist to set the price
equal to ν
ν−1
times her marginal cost, ψi(t), resulting in (4). Substituting this
optimal price into (11) gives (5). Using this in (12) yields (6). Profit flows are
given by quantity times the mark-up, i.e. π(ωi, t) = χ(ωi, t) [p(ωi, t)− ψi(t)]. With
13
(4)-(6) this reduces to (7). Using (5) in (3) yields (8). Finally, the total amount of
machines used in industry i is given by
∫Mi(t)
0
χ(ωi, t)dωi = Mi(t)Li(t). Since each
of these machines causes variable cost of ν−1
ν
units of intermediate input yi(t), the
total number of intermediate inputs used to produce machines is given by (9).
So far the number of available machine varieties, Mi(t), has been treated as exoge-
nous. As a next step we specify how a new machine variety can be introduced.
3.2.3 Production possibilities frontier
By spending 1
η
units of output of industry i as R&D investments, a new machine
variety χ(ωi, t) can be invented. Hence, we have
M˙i(t) = ηzi(t), (13)
where zi(t) denotes intermediate inputs of type i used for R&D investments (in
industry i). There is free entry into research and a successful innovator obtains a
perpetual patent on a machine variety ωi. Mi(0), ∀i is exogenously given and we
assume Mi(0) = 1, ∀i.
6 Considering a situation with positive R&D investments in
all industries i, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. With positive R&D investments, the value of a machine producing firm
is given by
v(ωi, t) = vi(t) =
w(t)(ν − 1)
ηMi(t)
, ∀ωi. (14)
Moreover, we must have
r(t)−
w˙(t)
w(t)
+
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
=
ηLi(t)
ν
, ∀i. (15)
6This assumption is not crucial, but simplifies the analysis. Basically, as we will see below, it
normalizes all relative prices between any two intermediate inputs to one at t = 0.
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Proof. (14) highlights the fact that at each point in time, the value of a firm must be
equal to the R&D cost of creating a new one, pi(t)
η
, where we substitute pi(t) by (6).
(15) is just the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) representation of the zero ex-ante
profit condition, i.e. r(t)vi(t)− v˙i(t) = πi(t), where we make use of (14).
In order to close the model we need to specify the demand side of the economy. As
motivated in Section 2 this demand side has to allow for non-homothetic preferences.
3.3 Demand side
Suppose we have a unit interval of identical households endowed with L units of
inelastically supplied labor and A(0) units of (initial) wealth. Each household has
the following preferences
U(0) =
∫
∞
0
exp (−ρt)
[
1
ǫ
E(t)ǫ −
β
γ
PN(t)
γ −
1
ǫ
+
β
γ
]
dt, (16)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preferences and the term in squared brackets is
the indirect instantaneous utility function. This instantaneous utility function is
defined over the nominal expenditure level, E(t), and the prices of durables and
non-durables. But as we have chosen the price of durables as our nume´raire, only the
(relative) price of non-durables, PN(t), shows up in (16). We have 0 < ǫ < 1, γ ≤ ǫ
and β > 0. The intratemporal preferences are identical to Boppart (2011) and are a
subclass of “price independent generally linearity” (PIGL) preferences specified in
Muellbauer (1975) and Muellbauer (1976).7 The virtue of these preferences is that,
although they are non-homothetic (and moreover do not fall into the Gorman class),
the analysis of intertemporal optimization is very tractable.
7For more detail on these preferences, the reader is referred to Boppart (2011), where it is
shown that these preferences remain very tractable even if we allow for household heterogeneity
and population growth. However, note that the parameter space is slightly different compared to
Boppart (2011) in order to allow for cases where the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.
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The intratemporal preferences are only well defined if the expenditure level exceeds
a certain threshold. In order to ensure this, we assume henceforth
E(t)ǫ ≥ βPN(t)
γ. (17)
This condition will be fulfilled as long as the factor endowments L and A(0) are
“sufficiently large”. A condition in terms of exogenous model parameters which
guarantees (17) is stated later on. Total consumption expenditures, E(t), are spent
on durables, XD(t) and non-durables, XN(t). Applying Roy’s identity yields the
following demand system:
Lemma 3. Intratemporal optimization implies
XD(t) = E(t)− βE(t)
1−ǫPN(t)
γ, (18)
XN(t) = βE(t)
1−ǫPN(t)
γ−1, (19)
at each date in time.
We see that the demands are non-linear functions of the expenditure level E(t).
Hence, we have non-homothetic preferences.8 Condition (17) ensures the consumed
quantities to be non-negative. The expenditure share devoted to non-durables,
SN(t) ≡
PN (t)XN (t)
E(t)
, can be written as
SN(t) = βE(t)
−ǫPN(t)
γ. (20)
Clearly, SN(t) is declining in E(t) and Engel’s law applies.
9 The expenditure elastic-
ity of demand and the elasticity of substitution are the two elasticities that control
8The class of preferences (16) does enclose a homothetic case with ǫ→ 0. But in this paper we
focus on the more interesting non-homothetic cases with ǫ > 0.
9Interestingly, it is even consistent with the functional form Ernst Engel had in mind while
studying the expenditure structure of Belgian workers. See Engel (1857), p. 30: “Das Gesetz, mit
welchem man es hier zu thun hat, ist kein einfaches. Die Ho¨he der Ausgaben fu¨r Nahrung wachsen
bei Abnahme des Wohlstandes in einer geometrischen Progression.”
16
the effects of changes in expenditure levels and relative prices on the demand struc-
ture. The expenditure elasticity of demand for non-durables is equal to 1− ǫ, which
is strictly smaller than unity. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution is given by
1−γ+(ǫ−γ) SN (t)
1−SN (t)
. So the elasticity of substitution is in general time varying and
can be either larger or smaller than unity, depending on the parameter γ.10 Overall,
this means that both the income and substitution channel of structural change are
present in the model and their importance is controlled by the parameters ǫ and γ.
Next, we turn to the household’s intertemporal optimization problem. The house-
hold takes the interest rate, r(t), and wage rate, w(t), as given and maximizes (16)
subject to the flow budget constraint and the transversality condition, which read
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t) + w(t)L− E(t) and lim
t→∞
E(t)ǫ−1A(t) exp [−ρt] = 0. (21)
This yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 4. Intertemporal optimization implies the following Euler equation
(1− ǫ)
E˙(t)
E(t)
= r(t)− ρ. (22)
Proof. The current Hamiltonian reads
H = V (E(t), PN(t)) + λ(t) [r(t)A(t) + w(t)L− E(t)] .
We can write the first-order conditions as
E(t)ǫ−1 − λ(t) = 0, (23)
r(t)λ(t) = ρλ(t)− λ˙(t). (24)
Taking the first derivative of (23) with respect to time and simplifying gives (22).
10As it will be shown later on, we have limt→∞ SN (t) = 0, so 1 − γ can be interpreted as the
asymptotic elasticity of substitution.
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This is the familiar form of the Euler equation which is consistent with a con-
stant growth path along which the saving and interest rate are constant. Note
that we obtain this simple Euler equation although intratemporal preferences are
non-homothetic.
3.4 Market clearing and resource constraints
Market clearing at the final output sector level implies
Yj(t) = Xj(t), j = {D,N} . (25)
On the industry level, market clearing requires
yi(t) = x˜i(t) + ci(t) + zi(t), ∀i ∈ [0, 1] , (26)
where yi(t) is total production of intermediate inputs. x˜i(t) is the total amount
of intermediate inputs used in final goods production. ci(t) are total intermediate
inputs used to produce machines and zi(t) are total intermediate inputs used as
R&D investments. Labor market clearing can be written as
L =
∫ 1
0
Li(t)di. (27)
Finally, asset market clearing implies
A(t) =
∫ 1
0
Mi(t)vi(t)di. (28)
3.5 Dynamic equilibrium
In this economy, a dynamic equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A dynamic equilibrium is a time path of expenditure, wealth and
consumption quantities {E(t), A(t), XN(t), XD(t)}
∞
t=0, prices, wage rate and interest
rate {PN(t), w(t), r(t)}
∞
t=0, available machine varieties, output, labor demand, R&D
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investment and price in each industry {Mi(t), yi(t), Li(t), zi(t), pi(t)}
∞
t=0, i ∈ [0, 1],
and quantity and price of all machines varieties in all industries {χ(ωi, t), p(ωi, t)}
∞
t=0,
∀ωi, i ∈ [0, 1] which are jointly consistent with household and firm optimization, the
resource constraint and market clearing, given the specified market structure (i.e.
perfect competition in all markets with the exception of the machine producers who
have a monopoly position).
Before solving the model, we briefly relate the specified framework to some reference
cases. First, with β = 0, the representative household only consumes good D
(i.e. durables). In this case, the perfectly symmetric unit interval of intermediate
inputs becomes obsolete and the economy coincides with the standard one-sector
lab-equipment model where households have CRRA preferences (see e.g. Acemoglu,
2009, chapter 13). Second, with ǫ → 0, σ2 = 0 and ∆ 6= 0, we have homothetic
preferences and identical technologies across sectors – with the exception of a Hicks-
neutral exogenous but sector specific TFP growth rate. In this case, the model
is very similar to Ngai and Pissarides (2007). The equilibrium dynamics feature
structural change due to relative price effects and we can solve the model explicitly
since the Kaldor facts will be fulfilled.11 However, such an analysis clearly abstracts
from biased technical change and there would be no income effects on the demand
structure. Third, with ǫ 6= 0, σ2 = 0 and ∆ 6= 0, the model becomes similar
to Boppart (2011) where structural change is driven by the non-homotheticity of
preferences. But since σ2 = 0 structural change at the sector level does not trickle
down to intermediary inputs and hence does not induce directed technical change
on the industry level. Finally, if we consider homothetic preferences (i.e. ǫ →
0), introduce two different types of labor (skilled and unskilled), and assume that
11The reason why the model would not be identical to Ngai and Pissarides (2007) is due to
the fact that they use a CES utility function, whereas in our model the elasticity of substitution
between durables and non-durables is not constant over time.
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different intermediate industries use these two labor types with different intensities,
we move towards a standard model of directed technical change a` la Acemoglu
(1998).
It is important to emphasize that none of the aforementioned models contain all the
characteristics motivated in Section 2. In the next subsection we solve our model
and show that it features industry directed technical change while the long-run
structural change is driven by both an income and a substitution effect.
3.6 Solving for the dynamic equilibrium path
3.6.1 Aggregate dynamics
We solve the model in two parts: First, we show that the dynamic equilibrium path
features standard balanced properties on the aggregate (i.e. the Kaldor facts are
fulfilled). Second, we characterize the sectoral dynamics. This is more complicated
since we have to deal with relatively rich dynamics at the disaggregate level. But
irrespectively of these sectoral dynamics, the next proposition shows that on the
aggregate the model has a unique dynamic path with a closed form solution.
Proposition 1. Suppose we have ηL
ν
> ρ > ǫηL
ν
. Then, the model features no
transitional dynamics and the real (durable good denominated) interest rate and the
growth rates of wealth, wages and expenditures are constant, i.e.
r =
ηL
ν
(29)
A˙(t)
A(t)
=
w˙(t)
w(t)
=
∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
E˙(t)
E(t)
=
1
1− ǫ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
≡ g > 0. (30)
Moreover, we have
w(t) =
1
ν − 1
exp [gt] , (31)
and
E(0) =
[
L
ν − 1
+
1
(1− ǫ)η
[
ρ−
ǫηL
ν
]]
≡ E0 > 0. (32)
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This is an equilibrium path as long as (17) is fulfilled for all t.
Proof. The choice of nume´raire PD(t) = 1 implies (see (1) and (6))
1 = (ν − 1)w(t) exp
[
−
∫ 1
0
log [Mi(t)] di
]
. (33)
By differentiating this with respect to time we get∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
w˙(t)
w(t)
. (34)
If we take the sum over all i ∈ [0, 1] of both sides of (15) and use the labor market
clearing condition, (27), we get
r(t)−
w˙(t)
w(t)
+
∫ 1
0
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
di =
ηL
ν
. (35)
Combining (34) and (35) yields
r(t) = r =
ηL
ν
.
This implies that in any equilibrium, the interest rate (in terms of durable goods)
must be constant over time. With a constant interest rate the Euler equation, (22),
implies a constant expenditure growth rate E˙(t)
E(t)
= g, where g > 0 because ηL
ν
> ρ.
The asset market clearing condition, (28), together with (14) implies A˙(t)
A(t)
= w˙(t)
w(t)
.
Finally, substituting this into the flow budget constraint, (21), implies A˙(t)
A(t)
= g.
This proves (29) and (30). For (31) note that (33) and the assumption Mi(0) = 1,
∀i implies w(0) = 1
ν−1
. Next, ci(t) and yi(t) are given by (9) and (8) and if we
combine (13) and (15) we get zi(t) = Mi(t)
[
Li(t)−L
ν
+ g
η
]
. Plugging this into the
market clearing condition, (26), implies
x˜i(t) =Mi(t)
[
Li(t)
ν − 1
+
1
ν
L−
g
η
]
. (36)
Finally we obtain total consumption expenditures E(t) =
∫ 1
0
pi(t)x˜i(t)di, where pi(t)
is given by (6). E0 is strictly positive since ρ >
ǫηL
ν
. This assumption also ensures
that the transversality condition is fulfilled and that utility is finite.
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Proposition 1 shows that the aggregate variables behave in the dynamic equilibrium
as in the steady state of a neoclassical growth model and Kaldor’s stylized facts
(see Kaldor, 1961) are fulfilled. It is noteworthy that we can solve for the aggregate
dynamics without knowing the exact equilibrium path of the disaggregate variables.
This separation keeps the problem tractable and allows us to find a closed form
characterization of the disaggregate dynamics, as we will show in the next step.
3.6.2 Disaggregate dynamics
The disaggregate equilibrium dynamics of this model are much richer than the aggre-
gate, because the expenditure structure, SN(t), and the intermediate input prices,
{pi(t)}
1
i=0, interact with each other in two ways. On the one hand, the dynamics
of intermediate input prices affect the (relative) price of non-durable goods, PN(t),
and consequently via a standard substitution effect the demand structure SN(t). On
the other hand, as in any theory of directed technical change, the demand structure
determines the (industry specific) R&D investment incentive and via this channel
the dynamics of intermediate industry prices. Interestingly, the causality of the two
effects go in different directions. The two effects are highlighted in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. The disaggregate dynamics can be summarized by the following equa-
tions:
SN(t) = βE
−ǫ
0 exp
[
−ǫgt− γ∆t+ γ
∫ 1
0
[α(i)− 1] log [pi(t)] di
]
, (37)
and
pi(t) = exp
[
−η
ν − 1
ν
E0
∫ t
0
SN(τ) [α(i)− 1] dτ
]
, ∀i, (38)
where expenditures at date zero, E0, and the growth rate, g, are defined in Proposition
1.
Proof. First, note that we can write E(t) = E0 exp [gt] (see (30) and (32)). If we use
this expression and (2) in (20), we obtain (37).
22
Second, let us prove equation (38): Since the final consumption goods are produced
competitively with Cobb-Douglas technologies (implying output elasticities of the
durable and non-durable sector which are equal to unity and α(i)), we must have
pi(t)x˜i(t) = E(t)SN(t)α(i) + E(t) [1− SN(t)]. If we substitute pi(t), x˜i(t) in this
equation by the expressions (6) and (36) and use the definition of g and E0, we get
(ν − 1)w(t)
[
Li(t)− L
ν − 1
+ E0
]
= E(t)SN(t)α(i) + E(t) [1− SN(t)] .
If we additionally substitute w(t) by (31) and E(t) by E0 exp [gt] and simplify terms,
we have
Li(t)− L = SN(t)(ν − 1) [α(i)− 1] E0. (39)
Now, if we use (29) and (30) in (15), we get
M˙i(t)
Mi(t)
=
η [Li(t)− L]
ν
+ g. (40)
Then, combining this with (6), (31) (and the fact that Mi(0) = 1, ∀i) we can write
pi(t) = exp
[
−
η
ν
∫ t
0
(Li(τ)− L) dτ
]
.
If we substitute Li(τ)−L in this expression by the analog of equation (39) we obtain
equation (38).
(37) visualizes the substitution effect of intermediate industry prices on the demand
structure, whereas (38) formalizes the directed technical change effect from the ex-
penditure structure on the industry price dynamic.
The expenditure share of the non-durable sector, SN(t), changes over time for two
reasons: First, households have non-homothetic preferences and (per-capita) expen-
ditures grow along the dynamic equilibrium path with rate g. Since non-durables are
necessities and durables luxuries, SN(t) tends to decline over time. The magnitude
of this effect is governed by the degree of non-homotheticity of preferences, ǫ, and
the growth rate of (per-capita) expenditures, g. With homothetic preferences (i.e.
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ǫ = 0) we would have no income effect on the demand structure and the correspond-
ing term in (37) would vanish. The second reason why SN(t) changes over time is
that the relative price PN(t) varies. Clearly, the relative price changes due to the
exogenous difference in TFP growth rates, ∆. But in addition, PN(t) varies since
there are differences in the intensities with which the sectoral outputs depend on
the different intermediate industries (represented by the α(i)’s) and since industry
specific prices, pi(t), change according to directed technical progress. The sign and
magnitude of this relative price effect on the demand structure is determined by
the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors, which itself is controlled by
the parameter γ. If the (asymptotic) elasticity of substitution between goods and
services is unity (i.e. γ = 0) the demand structure is independent of the relative
price PN(t). If durables and non-durables are (asymptotically) gross substitutes
(i.e. γ < 0) the sector which experiences a relative price increase loses in terms of
expenditure shares. With gross complements the opposite is true.
Equation (38) characterizes how endogenous technical change affects the price of
intermediate industry i. In a given point in time τ , the growth rate of the price of
industry i is given by the inverse of R&D activity in this industry (relative to the
average over all industries). More formally12,
p˙i(τ)
pi(τ)
= g −
M˙i(τ)
Mi(τ)
.
Consequently, the price of industry i at date t is given by the history of R&D
activities up to date t. What determines the R&D activity in industry i at a given
date τ? As equation (15) shows, this R&D activity is positively related to the
number of people employed in the industry. This is a standard market size effect
indicating that the incentive to innovate a new machine increases proportionally to
the number of workers that use it. The number of workers in industry i is above
12This follows immediately from (6) and (31). The average of the R&D activity over all industries
shows up because of the choice of nume´raire.
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average if the intensity, α(i), with which non-durable good production depends on
it exceeds unity (see (39)). Moreover, given that industry i is, as an input, more
intensively used by the non-durable sector (i.e. α(i) > 1), the number of workers
employed in this industry is increasing in the expenditure share of non-durables.
Equations (37) and (38) define a system of equations in SN(t) and {pi(t)}
1
i=0. By
setting t equal to zero, we obtain the initial conditions
pi(0) = 1, ∀i, (41)
and
SN(0) = β
[
L
ν − 1
+
1
(1− ǫ)η
[
ρ−
ǫηL
ν
]]−ǫ
= βE−ǫ0 . (42)
Solving the system of equations we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Along the dynamic equilibrium path, the sectoral dynamics are char-
acterized by
SN(t) =
SN(0)
exp [(γ∆+ ǫg)t] + [exp [(γ∆+ ǫg)t]− 1]
SN (0)γη
ν−1
ν
σ2E0
γ∆+ǫg
, (43)
where SN(0) is given by (42). Moreover, we have
PN(t) = exp
[
ǫg
γ
t
](
SN(t)
SN(0)
) 1
γ
, (44)
Li(t) = L+ (ν − 1)E0 [α(i)− 1]SN(t), (45)
and
pi(t) =
[
SN(t)
SN(0)
exp [(γ∆+ ǫg)t]
]α(i)−1
γσ2
. (46)
This is an equilibrium path under the parameter restrictions stated in Proposition 1
and as long as (17) is fulfilled for all t.
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Proof. Substituting pi(t) in (37) by (38) and using the fact that
∫ 1
0
[α(i)− 1]2 di =
σ2,
SN(t) = SN(0) exp
[
−γ∆t− ǫgt− γη
ν − 1
ν
σ2E0
∫ t
0
SN(τ)dτ
]
. (47)
Differentiating both sides of this equations with respect to time we obtain the fol-
lowing differential equation
S˙N(t)
SN(t)
= −γ∆− ǫg − γη
ν − 1
ν
σ2E0SN(t). (48)
By solving this differential equation we obtain (43). Once we have solved for this,
(44)-(46) follow immediately from (20), (39) as well as (38) and (47).
Proposition 2 shows that we indeed obtain closed form solutions for all variables.
Finally, note that we assumed that (17) is fulfilled along the entire path. We are now
prepared to state conditions on the exogenous parameters such that this condition is
indeed met. This is done in the next proposition. Recall that condition (17) ensures
that the expenditure share devoted to non-durables does not exceed unity. As we
can see from (43), the dynamics of SN(t) depend on several parameter values. In
the following we focus on a case in which the durable good sector is asymptotically
dominant, for which we get:
Proposition 3. Suppose
γ∆+
ǫ
1− ǫ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
≥ 0, (49)
γ∆+
ǫ
1− ǫ
[
ηL
ν
− ρ
]
> −γη
ν − 1
ν
σ2β
[
L
ν − 1
+
1
(1− ǫ)η
[
ρ−
ǫηL
ν
]]1−ǫ
, (50)
and
β <
[
L
ν − 1
+
1
(1− ǫ)η
[
ρ−
ǫηL
ν
]]ǫ
. (51)
Then, condition (17) is fulfilled along the entire path and the dynamics in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 characterize a dynamic equilibrium path.
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Proof. (51) ensures that (17) is fulfilled at date t = 0 (see (42)). Moreover, (49) and
(50) ensure that S˙N (t)
SN (t)
< 0, ∀t ≥ 0 (see (48)). Hence, SN(0) is smaller or equal to
one and it is falling over time. Consequently, (17) is fulfilled for all t ≥ 0.
We are now ready to discuss the equilibrium dynamics on the disaggregate level.
The assumptions in Proposition 3 make sure that SN(t) is declining over time. An
easy way to see the dynamics of SN(t) is in equation (48). The non-homotheticity
channel leads to a declining SN(t), since non-durables are necessities by assumption
and expenditures grow over time. So the conditions in Proposition 3 ensure that
this declining trend in SN(t) due to income effects is not overturned by a relative
price effects. Whether the relative price effects increases or decreases SN(t) depends
on the elasticity of substitution as well as on how PN(t) changes over time. If the
(asymptotic) elasticity of substitution is larger than unity (i.e. if γ < 0), an increase
in the relative price, PN(t), decreases the expenditure share devoted to non-durables.
With γ > 0 the opposite is true. For the growth rate of the (relative) price of the
non-durable sector, we obtain (see (44) and (48))
P˙N(t)
PN(t)
= −∆− η
ν − 1
ν
σ2E0SN(t). (52)
The relative price changes because of the exogenous TFP growth rate difference, ∆,
as well as because of industry specific technical progress (captured by the second
term in (52)).
With S˙N (t)
SN (t)
being always negative the expenditure share of non-durable goods asymp-
totically converges to zero and the durable sector is therefore asymptotically dom-
inant.13 As time goes to infinity, S˙N (t)
SN (t)
converges to − (γ∆+ ǫg), which is still
negative (see assumption (49)). In this sense, structural change does not come to
a halt and does exist even asymptotically. In contrast, since asymptotically the di-
13Note that just the expenditure share of non-durables goes to zero. In levels non-durable good
expenditures go to infinity.
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rection of industry specific technical change is fully determined by the durable good
sector, we have
lim
t→∞
P˙N(t)
PN(t)
= −∆. (53)
Hence, asymptotically, the growth rate of the relative price does not change anymore
(but it can differ from zero).
The theory offers relatively rich dynamics. It is worthwhile to emphasize that these
dynamics occur along the equilibrium path of a dynamic general equilibrium model.
Consequently there are no exogenous shifts in demand or supply. Since the (asymp-
totic) elasticity of substitution can be either larger or smaller then unity (i.e. γ ⋚ 0)
our theory does not take a stand whether the expenditure share, SN(t), increases or
decreases in the relative price (see (20)). In addition, because there are both relative
price and income effects on the expenditure structure, the elasticity of substitution
between durables and non-durables is not so easy to infer. For instance, the fact
that the expenditure share of non-durable goods declined whereas the relative price
of non-durable goods increased over the last 80 years does not automatically im-
ply that the elasticity of substitution has to be larger than unity. It could well be
that it is strictly smaller than unity but the relative price effect on the expenditure
structure is overturned by an income effect.
From (52) it is clear that our theory does not make a prediction about the average
level of relative price growth (i.e. whether PN(t) is increasing or declining). De-
pending on the sign of ∆ this can either be negative or positive. However, the theory
does make a clear prediction how P˙N (t)
PN (t)
changes over time: The growth rate of the
(relative) price of a sector which experiences a decline in terms of its expenditure
share increases over time. This is consistent with Figure 1 and 2. The reason for this
dynamic is directed technical change. As the expenditure share of the non-durable
sector shrinks, (45) shows that a declining amount of labor is allocated to industries
which are relative intensively used by the non-durable sector (i.e. with α(i) > 1).
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A declining market size in these sectors imply a declining R&D activity (see (40))
and an increasing industry specific price growth p˙i(t)
pi(t)
. This effect constitutes the so
called market size effect. Formally, this can be seen from combining (46) and (48)
and writing the industry specific price growth as
p˙i(t)
pi(t)
= − [α(i)− 1] η
ν − 1
ν
E0SN(t). (54)
As the price growth rate of industries that are more intensively used in the non-
durable sector increases, the growth rate of the relative price of non-durables, PN(t),
increases too.14
It is the aim of the next section to test this prediction of industry directed technical
change using disaggregate U.S. data. By doing so we explicitly make use of the input-
output structure of the U.S. economy. This allows us to identify the variation in the
industrial market shares which is exogenous from the perspective of an individual
firm that makes the decision of how much to invest in R&D.
4 Empirical Application
4.1 Testing for the market size effect
In the following, we test for our theory’s prediction how structural change in terms of
final consumption translates into changes in the market sizes of different industries
at the value-added level and how this in turns affects industry specific TFP and
output price growth rates. We use U.S. data from EU KLEMS covering 30 different
industries and 30 years.15 For our analysis we build five-year spells, which leads
to 180 observations. Our model’s main prediction suggest a negative (positive)
correlation between an industry’s market size and its price (TFP) growth rate. This
14For this see (2), which implies that we have P˙N (t)
PN (t)
= −∆+
∫ 1
0
(α(i)− 1) p˙i(t)
pi(t)
di.
15A precise list of data sources can be found in Online Appendix B.
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motivates the following regression
di(t) = δ log si(t− l) + κi + φ(t) + ui(t), (55)
where di(t) is one of the dependent variables (i.e. either the TFP or the price growth
rate). si(t − l) is the market size of industry i, κi and φ(t) represent a full set of
industry and time fixed effects and ui(t) is an error term. The TFP and price growth
rates, di(t), are calculated as log-differences over the five-year interval between t and
t − 5. The market size measures the average fraction of industry value-added, vai,
relative to total GDP over a five-year interval, or formally16
si(t− l) =
1
5
5∑
k=1
vai(t− l − k)
GDP (t− l − k)
. (56)
An important question is the timing. In our theory, where all agents are perfectly
forward looking and R&D investments immediately result in a TFP enhancing in-
novation, expenditure shares and TFP growth rates co-move instantaneously. Ar-
guably, this is not true in reality and for this reason we explore different time lags of
length of zero, one and two periods (i.e. l = 0, 5, 10). The industry and time fixed
effects are included to control for industry specific differences in the effectiveness of
R&D investments and time trends in the average productivity growth rate.17 Our
theory of directed technical change makes a prediction about the sign of δ and this
is the parameter of main interest.
Table 1 presents results of our baseline specification using the industry specific price
growth rate as a dependent variable. The contemporaneous logarithmized value-
added share shows no significant correlation with the current rate of price growth,
which is displayed in column (1). However, if we take lagged market shares we see
16Note that this allows us to interpret it directly as an industry’s market share. Both terms
market size and market share will be used interchangeably in the following.
17Note again that our theory’s main prediction is about changes in industry specific TFP and
price growth rates and not their levels.
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a negative correlation with the price growth rate (see columns (2) and (3) in Table
1). This finding might have two different interpretations. On the one hand, the
evolution of market shares might not perfectly be foreseen and R&D investments
might take some time to materialize. This suggests that the correlation between an
industry’s market size and price growth rate is zero contemporaneously, becomes
negative after some years and finally attenuates again. In Online Appendix A, we
show for a subset of years and industries for which we have a measure of the R&D
stock, that the growth rate of the R&D stock reacts immediately (and that there
is no anticipating effect). This is in line with the found lags of the effects on prices
(and TFP later on).
On the other hand, the low and insignificant coefficient in column (1) could also
be the result of reversed causality. Suppose the industry specific price fluctuates
for exogenous reasons. Then, if the short run elasticity of substitution is smaller
than one, periods with high prices are correlated with high value-added shares. This
mechanical effect runs in the opposite direction of the market size effect of induced
innovation and attenuates the estimate for δ. One way to relax this problem is to
use the lagged value-added share. In column (4) we include both the contemporane-
ous and the lagged market share and show that the coefficient of the lagged market
share remains significant. This mitigates the concern that the coefficient in column
(2) is driven by the mechanical contemporaneous effect as well as a serial correlation
in the independent variable.
The magnitude of the estimated effect of column (2) suggests that a one percent
increase in an industry’s market share relative to GDP decreases the price growth
rate by 0.52 percentage points over the next five years. Given the standard deviation
of this variable of 21 percentage points, this is an economically significant effect.
Since there exists a strong negative correlation between the industry specific TFP
growth rates and the relative price changes, it is not surprising to find the analog
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Dependent variable: Price growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share 0.026 0.847**
(0.088) (0.374)
L.Log market share -0.522*** -1.081***
(0.202) (0.335)
L2.Log market share -0.419**
(0.168)
N 180 150 120 150
R2 0.312 0.441 0.484 0.570
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 1: OLS regression on price growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed effects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed effects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variable is
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-difference. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two
period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (56)).
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positive effect of a larger market size on the TFP growth rate. Table 2 presents our
estimates using the five-year TFP growth rates as the dependent variable. Qualita-
tively the same picture as in Table 1 remains, even though the effects are slightly
smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated.
The identification strategy of the OLS regressions relies on the assumption that
Dependent variable: TFP growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log market share -0.104 -0.533**
(0.071) (0.260)
L.Log market share 0.241** 0.593**
(0.119) (0.247)
L2.Log market share 0.145*
(0.081)
N 180 150 120 150
R2 0.489 0.549 0.587 0.624
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 2: OLS regression of TFP growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed effects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed effects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-difference. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two
period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (56)).
firms – that make the R&D investment decision – do take the industry market size
as exogenously given. However, this might not be the case. Especially, some large
firms might take into account that their innovation activity can affect the industry
price index and consequently their market size. Depending on the elasticity of sub-
stitution this would bias our estimate up- or downwards. To address this concern
we offer an IV strategy where we instrument the industry market size by its compo-
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nent stemming from the structural change at the final consumption level. This is in
line with our theory, where structural change at the final good level trickles down –
via the input-output structure of the economy – to the industry value-added level,
where it determines the incentive to innovate.
Hence, in order to construct our instrument we require the U.S. input-output tables.
We first have to close the gap between purchaser’s prices and producer’s prices.18
This is done by the “Personal Consumption Expenditure Bridge Table”. Then
the input-output tables of the year 2002 are used to calculate how much nominal
value-added in industry i is needed in order to produce one U.S. dollar sale of fi-
nal consumption good j. As in the theoretical section we denote this requirement
coefficient as αj(i). Given the gross nominal consumption, pjyj, of 76 final consump-
tion sectors j = 1, ..., Q and these intensities αj(i), we can then construct for each
industry and year the “potential” market size
v˜ai(τ) =
Q∑
j=1
αj(i)pj(τ)yj(τ). (57)
This potential market size is the value-added that would have been generated in
industry i if the intensities would have been the same as in the year 2002. With this
potential market size we can calculate our instrument, the potential market share,
as
s˜i(t− l) =
1
5
5∑
k=1
v˜ai(t− l − k)
E(t− l − k)
, (58)
18The producer’s price of a good is the value the producer obtains when the good leaves the
factory, while the purchaser’s price is the price the consumer pays in a store when buying the
good. Thus, the main difference is that the later contains distribution costs (like sales tax or
transportation costs) while the former does not.
A detailed application of input-output tables is found in Online Appendix B.
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where the denominator is simply total consumer expenditures E(t − l − k) =∑Q
j=1 pj(t − l − k)yj(t − l − k).
19 The identifying assumption of this instrument
is that individual firms consider the final sales in the 76 consumption categories as
exogenously given. More specifically, firms do not consider that their own R&D
investments can affect the price indices of the different final consumption categories
and consequently their market size. For example, the assumption is that a single
tire producer takes the market size of newly sold cars as exogenously given and does
not consider it to be influenceable by his own R&D investments.
Table 3 and 4 and summarize the results when we instrument the market share,
si(t− l), by our measure of potential market share.
20 The effects on both the price
growth rate and the industry specific TFP growth are slightly higher, but qualita-
tively they show the same, consistent pattern: The coefficients of the one period
lagged variables is large and statistically significant at least at the five percent level.
With a two period lag, the coefficients get smaller and the contemporaneous effects
are small (and at least in the case of the TFP growth insignificant). The coefficient
in column (2) of Table 4 suggests that a one percent increase in its market share
increases the industry specific TFP growth rate by 0.3 percentage points over the
next five years. Given the average five-year TFP growth rate of 4.3 percent, this is
an economically significant effect.
19Note that this measure of total consumer expenditures differs slightly from the one reported
in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since our measure of potential market size
corrects for expenditures on imported (intermediate) goods.
20The corresponding first stage regressions can be found in Online Appendix A.
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Dependent variable: Price growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share -0.210**
(0.096)
L.Log market share -0.602***
(0.232)
L2.Log market share -0.437**
(0.199)
N 180 150 120
R2 0.279 0.438 0.483
Method IV IV IV
Table 3: IV regression on price growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed effects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed effects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-difference. The Log market share is instrumented
by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 4.1. First stage regression results are found in
Online Appendix A. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (56)).
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Dependent variable: TFP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Log market share 0.090
(0.102)
L.Log market share 0.296**
(0.144)
L2.Log market share 0.209**
(0.098)
N 180 150 120
R2 0.459 0.547 0.584
Method IV IV IV
Table 4: IV regression on TFP growth
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and displayed in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at
5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. All regressions include year fixed effects (4-6 intervals) and industry fixed effects (30 groups).
The total sample period runs from 1977-2007, but observations are grouped into five-year intervals. The independent variables are
averaged over five years, the dependent variable is calculated as the five-year log-difference. The Log market share is instrumented
by the structural change at the final consumption good level as described in Section 4.1. First stage regression results are found in
Online Appendix A. “L.” and “L2.” denotes a one and two period lag respectively (i.e. l = 5 and l = 10 in equation (56)).
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5 Conclusion
This paper presented a parsimonious model of industry directed technical change
where households have non-homothetic preferences. Within our theoretical frame-
work we show how structural change at the final output level translates into struc-
tural change at the industry value-added level. In line with the directed technical
change literature, the industry specific market share is the key determinant of R&D
investments. A change in households’ expenditure profile leads to a systematic shift
in industry specific TFP growth rates and consequently relative prices. However,
the changing relative prices themselves create a feedback effect on households’ ex-
penditure structure. Hence, our model also incorporates the relative price channel of
structural change. Although replicating this rich disaggregate structure, the model
features constant growth on the aggregate and has a closed form solution.
Building on our theoretical model, we evaluated the market size effect empirically.
Working with input-output tables, we constructed a measure of market size that is
driven by an arguably exogenous component of structural change at the final out-
put level. Our identification strategy then allowed us to evaluate the importance
of the market size hypothesis across the complete set of U.S. industries. Robust to
different specifications, we find that a one percent increase in an industry’s market
share increases its TFP growth rate by about 0.3 percentage points or equivalently
reduces its price growth by −0.6 percentage points (over a five year period). Con-
sistent with our expectation, we also document that while R&D investments react
simultaneously to an increase in market size, it takes about 5 years for these invest-
ments to result in larger TFP growth rates and falling prices.
Our results can be read as a qualification to the “Baumol’s cost disease”, which
states that with an elasticity of substitution smaller than unity, sectors with a lower
TFP growth rate account for an increasing fraction of total GDP and consequently,
the economy’s aggregate growth rate declines as sectors with lower technical progress
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constitute a larger fraction of the economy. Our qualification is twofold: First, we
emphasize the non-homotheticity of preferences as a driver of structural change. If
the production process of luxuries (with an expenditure elasticity of demand larger
than one) exhibited faster technical change, there might be no cost disease – even
if the elasticity of substitution were less than unity. The second challenge is due to
the endogenous direction of technical change. If – as our results suggest – bigger
markets attract more R&D investments, the TFP growth rate of faster expanding
sectors will endogenously increase. Consequently, the ranking of the sectors along
the rate of technical progress is not stable over time. The sectors that feature today
a low rate of technical change and account for an increasing fraction of GDP might
transform into tomorrow’s engine of technical progress.
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